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REMOVING TEMPTATION: PER SE REVERSAL FOR
JUDICIAL INDICATION OF BELIEF IN THE
DEFENDANT'S GUILT
INTRODUCTION

In 1930, Harry Murdock was tried in United States District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois for violations of the Revenue Acts of
1926 and 1928.' In his charge to the jury, the judge expressed his opinion that the defendant was "guilty in manner and form as charged be-3
yond a reasonable doubt."2 Not surprisingly, Murdock was convicted.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction'
and the Supreme Court affirmed on numerous grounds, including a finding of error in the judge's charge.' The Court held that although federal
judges have great power to comment on the evidence at trial, they must
leave the ultimate factual determinations to the jury.6 The Court acknowledged the power of the judge to express an opinion as to the defendant's guilt, but limited this authority to the most extreme cases, such
as when the evidence of the defendant's guilt is almost undisputed.'
Nearly forty years later, James Davis was tried in San Francisco Superior Court for first degree robbery and assault with intent to commit
murder.' The trial judge charged the jury that in his opinion "the guilt
of the Defendant. . . has been proved beyond reasonable doubt." 9 Davis was found guilty and the California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction."0 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued Davis a writ of habeas corpus, I I but the Ninth Circuit,
hearing the case en banc in order to clarify a previous holding in a simi1. See Murdock v. United States, 62 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1932), afftd, 290 U.S. 389
(1933).
2. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 393 (1933).
3. See id. at 391.
4. See Murdock, 62 F.2d at 928.
5. See Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394.
6. See id.
7. See id.The Court cited Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920), as
one such exceptional case. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in Horning, allowed a
federal judge to indicate his belief in the defendant's guilt because "upon the undisputed
evidence the defendant was guilty." Id. at 137. Justice Brandeis, however, writing for
three of four dissenting justices, believed that the use of the instruction at issue was an
unacceptable coercion of the jury and a usurpation of the jury's role. See id. at 139
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8. See Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 933 (1974); People v. Davis, 260 Cal. App. 2d 211, 67 Cal. Rptr. 35, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 890 (1968).
9. Davis, 485 F.2d at 1139.
10. See People v. Davis, 260 Cal. App. 2d 211, 217, 67 Cal. Rptr. 35, 39, cert denied,
393 U.S. 890 (1968).
11. Davis v. Craven, No. C-70 1234 AJZ, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1971),
rev'd, 485 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
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lar case, reversed the issuance by a vote of seven to five.12
What can explain these seemingly incongruous results? Murdock involved a federal trial appealed through direct review. 3 Davis, however,
originally involved a state trial and entered the federal system on collateral appeal through the habeas corpus process. 14 The court of appeals in
Davis did not regard the holding in Murdock as one of constitutional
magnitude and therefore found habeas corpus relief to be unavailable.15
Because the Murdock Court did not state that its holding was based on
constitutional grounds,16 the Davis court apparently read Murdock as es-

tablishing only a procedural rule for federal trial courts, not a constitutional mandate.

Federal appeals courts exercise supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in federal district courts and therefore can establish standards for trial court procedure separate from those mandated by
the Constitution. 7 When a federal appellate court finds a district court's
12. See Davis, 485 F.2d at 1140, 1142. The Ninth Circuit was attempting to clarify
the holding in Gonsior v. Craven, 449 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1971).
13. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 391 (1933). Direct review refers to
the review by a higher court of a lower court's final decision. The courts of appeals are
authorized to review final decisions of district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The
Supreme Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1982), may issue a writ of certiorari in
order to review the decision of a court of appeals. Direct review may be contrasted with
the collateral attack of habeas corpus whereby a federal court reviews the final decision of
a state court. The power of federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus to prisoners in
state custody is currently authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1982). For a general
treatment of the long and varied history of the writ of habeas corpus, see J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Post Trial Rights, §§ 86-126 (1976); D. Wilkes, Federal
and State Postconviction Remedies and Relief §§ 2-1 to -4, 3-1 to -2, 5-1 to -12, 8-1 to -54
(1983); C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 53 (4th ed. 1983); L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies §§ 2-6, 15-21 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Note, FederalHabeas Corpus Review
of State ForfeituresResulting From Assigned Counsel's Refusal to Raise Issues on Appeal,
52 Fordham L. Rev. 850, 850-51 nn.1-3 (1984).
14. See Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 933 (1974).
15. See id. at 1139-41.
16. See Murdock, 290 U.S. at 393-94.
17. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (federal courts may formulate procedural rules not required by the Constitution or Congress); United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733 (1980) (recognizing the use of federal supervisory power);
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (appellate courts may "require [trial courts]
to follow procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice
although in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution"); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts implies. . . establishing and maintaining civilized standards
of procedure and evidence."); Daye v. Attorney Gen., 712 F.2d 1566, 1570-71 (2d Cir.
1983) (recognizing the "stricter standard" of the supervisory power), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 723 (1984); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-3772 (1982) (Supreme Court has power to establish
rules governing criminal procedure prior to, including and after the verdict.); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (1982) ("Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress" may establish rules of conduct); Fed. R. App. P. 47 (courts of appeals may establish rules governing their practice). But see Beale, ReconsideringSupervisory Power in CriminalCases:
Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of the FederalCourts, 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1433, 1434-35 (1984) (arguing that current use of federal supervisory power is over-

19851

REMOVING TEMPTATION

1335

practice to be unacceptable, it can use its supervisory power to reverse
the conviction, thereby avoiding the issue of whether the challenged procedure violates the Constitution."8 In reviewing state court trials, however, federal courts are barred by principles of federalism from

establishing procedural standards for the states separate from those com-

pelled by the Constitution.' 9 Federal courts could reform state practices

by raising rules of procedure to a constitutional level," but they are understandably reluctant to intrude on state procedures in this manner."'
The desire to avoid reaching the question of constitutionality may have
broad and concluding that "the concept of supervisory power should be abandoned in
favor of identifying more specifically the constitutional or statutory power being
employed").
18. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); Daye v. Attorney Gen.,
712 F.2d 1566, 1570 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); Beale, supra note
17, at 1521. In general, courts will attempt to avoid making constitutional decisions if
other grounds are available. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 n.10 (1983);
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905); Bowman v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
744 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Moore v.
United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 954 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985); see also Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
500 (1941) (advisable for the Court to avoid "friction of a premature constitutional adjudication"); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (listing rules under which the Court has avoided passing on constitutional
questions); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909) (court may decline to
rule on constitutional grounds and base its decision on local or state questions only);
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885) (courts should not anticipate a question of constitutional law before it is necessary
nor formulate rule of constitutional law broader than is required by facts).
19. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S.
560, 582-83 (1981); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); Lacy v. Gabriel, 732 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 195 (1984); Daye v. Attorney Gen., 712 F.2d 1566, 1571 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1979); United States ex reL Gentry v. Circuit Court, 586 F.2d 1142,
1146 (7th Cir. 1978). This dual standard is evidenced by comparing Davis with a case
decided by the same circuit approximately six weeks later, United States v. Stephens, 486
F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1973). In Stephens' trial the judge said that the defendant was guilty;
the Ninth Circuit, distinguishing Davis and Gonsior, and relying on Murdock, reversed
the conviction on the basis of its supervisory power. See id. at 916-18. In Davis' trial the
state judge made a similar guilty statement, yet the conviction was not overturned. Davis
v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 1973) (en band), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933
(1974).
20. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); Daye v. Attorney Gen.,
712 F.2d 1566, 1571 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); Davis v. Craven,
485 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
21. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) ("we should not lightly
construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States"); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1967) ("States are free to provide
such [criminal] procedures as they choose. . . provided that none of them infringes a
guarantee in the Federal Constitution."); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967)
("[I]t has never been thought that. . . this Court [is] a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure."); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934) (A state is free to regulate its courts' procedure as long as it does not offend a
fundamental principle of justice. The Court will not find that a rule violates the fourteenth amendment merely "because another method may seem. . . fairer or wiser.").
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prompted the Seventh Circuit in Murdock to reverse on the basis of its
supervisory power. In light of this understandable caution and in view of
the close division of the Ninth Circuit judges in Davis, it appears, as the
Second Circuit has noted, that "reasonable judicial minds may . . . differ" 2 as to whether Murdock states a constitutional principle.
Part I of this Note argues that when a judge tells the jury that he
believes the defendant is guilty-makes a "guilty statement"-or acts in
such a way that it is clear to the jury that this is his belief-makes a
"guilty indication"-the defendant's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by
the sixth amendment and applied to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, has been violated. Part II concludes that such a violation is therefore a proper ground for habeas
corpus relief. In addition, it is suggested that because this action goes to
the integrity of the trial process, it should be considered sufficient error
to warrant per se reversal and a new trial. A rule of automatic reversal is
necessary because of the trial judge's strong influence over the jury, the

great likelihood of prejudice, the difficulty of retrospectively weighing
this prejudice and the fact that no other remedy will effectively deter this
type of judicial misconduct.
I.

INDICATION OF A TRIAL JUDGE'S BELIEF IN THE DEFENDANT'S
GUILT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR

A. The Right to a Fair Trial
The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.3 It has been held that the
24
Constitution confers on all criminal defendants the right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court has held that the "atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be
maintained at all costs." 25 Violation of the right to a fair trial is also 26a
denial of the right to due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment
and applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 27 The
22. Daye v. Attorney Gen., 712 F.2d 1566, 1571 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 723 (1984).
23. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
24. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S.
254, 260 (1922); United States v. Hill, 332 F.2d 105, 106 (7th Cir. 1964); Gomila v.
United States, 146 F.2d 372, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1944); Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779,
781 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942); Miller v. United States, 120 F.2d 968,
973 (10th Cir. 1941); Thacker v. Cox, 309 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Va. 1970); Sun Co. v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 822, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1973).
25. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); accord Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d
779, 781 (10th Cir.) ("There is no right more sacred to our institutions of government
than the right to a public trial by a fair and impartial jury; no wrong more grievous than
its denial."), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942).
26. U.S. Const. amend. V.
27. Id. amend. XIV, § 1; see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954); Kennedy
v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974); Lane v.
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Supreme Court has operated under the premise that the due process
clause ensures fundamental fairness in a criminal trial and that the fourteenth amendment protects against state criminal trials that disregard
fundamental fairness.2 8
In essence, these constitutional guarantees help ensure that the structural elements of a trial and appeal comport with principles of fundamental fairness. These elements cannot be skewed to tip the crucial balance
of impartiality to prejudice the accused. Such structural imbalances have
occurred, for example, in cases in which a judge has a pecuniary interest
in convicting the accused,2 9 a defendant has been denied the effective
assistance of counsel,30 an indigent defendant was denied transcripts to
be used in making his appeal, 3 extensive pretrial publicity has oc-

curred3" or a judge has commented on the defendant's failure to protest

his innocence after arrest.33 These imbalances have been found to violate
the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial trial.' Thus, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the Constitution requires certain actors to be present during a trial, each playing, to the best of his or her
ability, an important and strictly circumscribed role.

A fair tribunal is an essential element of due process necessary to guar-

antee a fair trial.3" If the trial judge acts improperly, thus infringing the

defendant's right to a fair trial, there is no one who can adequately rectify
the imbalance at trial. The trial judge has the primary responsibility to
ensure that the trial is fair;36 it is therefore essential that he be and appear
Warden, 320 F.2d 179, 186-87 (4th Cir. 1963); Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779, 781
(10th Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942).
28. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941); see also Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) (fair trial cannot
be based on coerced confession).
29. See, eg., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); Tuney v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
31. See, eg., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971); Draper v.Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495-500 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956) (plurality
opinion of Black, J.).
32. See, eg., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 508-12 (1971); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-29 (1961).
33. See Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the case
was tried without a jury, the court of appeals held that it was no longer reasonable to
"indulge in the comfortable fiction" that judges can totally disregard improper evidence,
finding that such evidence contributed to the verdict and that therefore the conviction
was in violation of due process. Id. at 878.
34. See, eg., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion
of Black, J.); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d
866, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1985).
35. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955); Daye v. Attorney Gen., 696 F.2d 186, 196 (2d Cir. 1982) (en bane), on remand,
712 F.2d 1566 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 723 (1984); Staton v. Mayes, 552
F.2d 908, 913 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977).
36. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) ("[i]f truth and fairness are
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impartial and neutral. 37 Although a judge has the power to question wit-

nesses, 38 sum up the evidence, 39 and, in federal court and in some states,
comment on the evidence," he should use this power in such a way as to
appear impartial, dispassionate and non-argumentative. 4 The judge's
words and actions are accorded great deference by the jury and may
"carry an authority bordering on the irrefutable." 4 2 He is the "symbol of
not to be sacrificed, the judge must exert substantial control over the proceedings");
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) ("trial courts must take strong measures
to ensure that the balance [of fairness] is never weighed against the accused"); United
States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir.) ("incumbent upon the court to strive to
preserve impartiality"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976); United States v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974) ("heavy obligation rests on trial
judges to effectuate the fair-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment").
37. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1980); Quercia v. United
States, 289 U.S. 466, 470-71 (1933); Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 875 (2d Cir.
1985); Anderson v. Warden, 696 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1111 (1983); United States v. Frazier, 584 F.2d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 1978); D.
Wilkes, supra note 13, § 8-10, at 133.
38. See Fed. R. Evid. 614(b) (court's power to interrogate witnesses); McCormick on
Evidence § 8, at 15 (E. Cleary ed. 1984) (under case law and federal rules, judge may
examine witnesses); 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 784, at 188-99, (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970
& Supp. 1984) (contains exhaustive list of federal and state cases and statutes).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933); Quercia v. United
States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-25 (1894);
United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Tourine, 428
F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971); United States v.
Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); Minner v. United
States, 57 F.2d 506, 513 (10th Cir. 1932); People v. Culhane, 45 N.Y.2d 757, 758, 380
N.E.2d 315, 316, 408 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978);
State v. Homer, 310 N.C. 274, 283, 311 S.E.2d 281, 286-87 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Vernille, 275 Pa. Super. 263, 270, 418 A.2d 713, 716-17 (1980); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 300.10(2) (McKinney 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1232 (1983).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933); Commonwealth v.
Vernille, 275 Pa. Super. 263, 270, 418 A.2d 713, 717 (1980); Cal. Const. art. VI, § 10;
Conn Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-216 (West Supp. 1984); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 768.29
(West 1982).
41. See Sadler v. United States, 303 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1962); Minner v. United
States, 57 F.2d 506, 513 (10th Cir. 1932); see also State v. Schoenbneelt, 171 Conn. 119,
124-25, 368 A.2d 117, 120 (1976) (judge's charge must be fair and reasonable). See supra
note 37.
42. 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 555, at 298 (2d ed. 1982); see
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 302 & n.20 (1981) (strong influence of the trial judge);
Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894) ("the influence of the trial judge on the
jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and. . . his lightest word or intimation
is received with deference, and may prove controlling"); Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S.
442, 452 (1893) (jury gives great weight to judge's words); Perricone v. Kansas City S.
Ry. Co., 704 F.2d 1376, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The trial judge is a potent figure indeed.
His instructions are lethal."); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 775 (4th Cir. 1983)
(the trial judge must always remember that he occupies "'a position of preeminence and
special persuasiveness' ") (quoting Pollard v. Fennell, 400 F.2d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 1968));
State v. Bunton, 312 Mo. 655, 665, 280 S.W. 1040, 1043 (1926) (" 'It must be
remembered that jurors watch courts closely, and place great reliance on what a trial
judge says and does. . . . Every remark dropped by the court, every act done by him
during the progress of the trial, is the subject of comment and conclusion by jurymen.' ")
(quoting State v. Allen, 100 Iowa 7, 12-13, 69 N.W. 274, 275 (1896)); State v. Wendel,
532 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (The jury pays very close attention to the trial
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even-handed justice,"4 3 and his bias, or even the appearance of bias, casts
suspicion on the trial process and can lead to a due process violation."

Because of this position of preeminence, a federal judge generally should
not indicate his belief in the guilt of the defendant, nor should his actions

give the jury the impression that he has such a belief.45

Possibly the most extreme example of bias concerned a procedure in
the District Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico requiring the
judge in a bench trial to act also as the prosecutor, when the Commonwealth did not provide one.' The First Circuit held that the practice

was inherently unfair.47 It did not satisfy the appearance of justice, and

provided the judge with the temptation to skew the balance between the
state and the accused.4" Because a judge is generally considered to be

better able than a jury to disregard prejudicial actions,4 9 it is difficult to
judge.); State v. Head, 24 N.C. App. 564, 565, 211 S.E.2d 534, 535 (1975) ("It has long
been held in this State that even the slightest intimation from a judge as to the strength of
the evidence. . . will always have great weight with a jury."); R. Traynor, The Riddle of
Harmless Error 72 (1970) ("When judicial comment has exceeded fair guidance and attempted to lead the jury to a particular verdict, the comment carries a high risk that it
influenced the jury."); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 Crim.
L. Rev. 208, 222 (judge's instructions have great effect on juries); Reed, Jury Simulation:
The Impact of Judge's Instructionsand Attorney Tactics on Decisionmaking, 71 1. Crim.
L. & Criminology 68, 71 (1980) (same).
43. United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
44. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Daye v. Attorney Gen., 696 F.2d
186, 197 (2d Cir. 1982) (en bane), on remand, 712 F.2d 1566 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161, 1169
(D.N.J. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 951 (1977).
45. See, e-g., United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 981, 984 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992 (1981); United States v. Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir.),
modified in part on other grounds, 624 F.2d 36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984
(1980). This proposition may be subject to the dictum in Murdock that such comment by
a judge does not warrant reversal when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. See United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933). See supra note 7. It is the position of this
Note that even in such cases, judicial comment of this type should be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant per se reversal. See infra Pt. II.B.
46. See Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718, 719-20 (1st Cir. 1966).
47. See id. at 721-22.
48. See id.
49. Rules of evidence that provide for a general exclusion of prejudicial evidence, see,
e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.403 (Vest 1979); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 19-12-3 (1978); Vt. R. Evid. 403, are designed to protect jurors from the effects of
prejudicial evidence. See, eg., United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Kopel, 552 F.2d 1265, 1270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 970 (1977);
United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 652-53 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 742 (1946); Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note. In light of judicial experience and knowledge of the law, however, in nonjury trials this concern for prejudice is
considered to be of lesser importance. See Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 878 (2d
Cir. 1985) (presumption that judges consider only relevant evidence); Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d at 653 (Frank, J., dissenting) (departures from normal evidence rules not
usually error when judge sits without jury); Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695, 708 (8th
Cir. 1932) (presumption in nonjury trial that the judge "acts only upon the basis of
proper evidence"), afid, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); Foster v. Continental Casualty Co., 141 Ga.
App. 415, 418, 233 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1977) (presumption in nonjury trial that judge can
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imagine that such a practice would be allowed before a jury. As Judge
Lumbard of the Second Circuit stated in a recent guilty indication case,
even in a trial in which both sides are represented by counsel the judge
cannot act as an arm of the prosecution."0
It has been held to be improper for the judge to indicate to the jury
that he believes that the defendant is lying." In Quercia v. United
States,5" the Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that the
judge should not have added to the evidence or commented in any way
that would be "likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury
and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate
consideration of the evidence."' 1 3 In one state, it was held to be reversible
prejudice when the judge stated in open court that the accused should
not be allowed near a knife that had been admitted into evidence as the
weapon used in the charged crime. 4 In California, a provision in the
state constitution that allows judges to "comment on the evidence and
testimony"5 5 has recently been construed to prohibit statements similar

to those allowed in Davis because they interfere with the jurors' ability to
"freely perform their fact-finding responsibility." 5 6
A judge can take many steps to remain impartial and avoid infecting
the trial process. At the most basic level, he should stay within the role

sift "'the wheat from the chaff'" (quoting Dowling v. Jones-Logan Co., 123 Ga. App.
380, 382, 181 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1971)); Pike v. Pike, 609 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc) (In nonjury trial "it is assumed the trial judge will not give weight to incompetent
evidence"); Vail v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 N.C. App. 726, 729, 189 S.E.2d 527,
529 (1972) (in nonjury trial, usual evidence rules are relaxed because "judge, being
knowledegeable of the law, is able to eliminate incompetent and immaterial testimony");
C. McCormick, supra note 38, § 60, at 153 (judge's professional experience lessens need
for exclusionary rules of evidence in nonjury trials). See generally Davis, Hearsay in
Nonjury Trials, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1970) (arguing for less strict rules of evidence in
nonjury trials).
50. See Daye v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.2d 1155, 1173 (2d Cir. 1981) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc), on remand, 712 F.2d 1566 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 723 (1984); accord United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d
431, 436-37 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235-36
(7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980); People v. Cruz, 100 A.D.2d 518, 518,
473 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1984) (mem.).
51. In Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933), the judge stated to the jury,
after his general instructions, that the defendant" 'wiped his hands during his testimony.
It is a rather a curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying . . . . I
think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government's testimony, was a lie.'" Id. at 468. The Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 472.
See United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Hoker, 483
F.2d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
53. Id. at 471-72.
54. See State v. Wendel, 532 S.W.2d 838, 839-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). The judge
stated "in the presence and hearing of the jury . ..'[s]tep over here with the knife, don't
leave that there. Look, I don't want that exhibit left anywhere where this man can get to
it.'" Id. at 839.
55. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 10.
56. People v. Cook, 33 Cal. 3d 400, 413, 658 P.2d 86, 94, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159, 167
(1983) (en banc).
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of moderator and avoid taking decisions on factual issues away from the
jury.5 7 When charging the jury, the judge violates due process if he appears to be clearly partial to the prosecution. 8 This is in accord with the
general principle that there can be no directed verdict of guilty in a criminal case.59
The American Bar Association has developed guidelines and recom-

mendations for the administration of criminal justice in a fair, balanced

and constitutional manner."° Standard 15-3.8(a) directly addresses the
type of judicial conduct at issue in this Note and concludes that the
"[t]he trial judge should not express or otherwise indicate to the jury

his or her personal opinion whether the defendant is guilty."'" The commentary to this section notes that it is difficult to see how such a state-

ment would not be prejudicial because it disparages the basic

presumption of innocence.62
This presumption has been held to be re63
quired by the Constitution.

Other court officers have been found to have significant influence on
the jury. In Parkerv. Gladden,' the Supreme Court found a violation of
due process when a bailiff uttered a guilty statement to members of the
jury that he was shepherding.6" The holding was based on the official
character of the bailiff and the obvious weight that such a statement
57. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1979); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,
394 (1933); People v. Cook, 33 Cal. 3d 400, 413, 658 P.2d 86, 94, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159, 167
(1983) (en banc); Pendergrast v. United States, 332 A.2d 919, 926 (D.C. 1975); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 742-43, 383 N.E.2d 851, 856 (1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 378 Mass. 296, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979); People v. Leahy, 60 A.D.2d 558,
558, 400 N.Y.S.2d 342, 342 (1977) (mem.); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 495 Pa. 662, 667,
435 A.2d 1212, 1215 (1981); 3 C. Wright, supra note 42, § 555, at 298.
58. See ieckory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 423 (1896). See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
59. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); United
States v. Musgrave, 444 F.2d 755, 762 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973);
Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961);
Konda v. United States, 166 F. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1908); Commonwealth v. Gallison, 384
Mass. 184, 193 n.5, 425 N.E.2d 276, 281 n.5 (1981); State v. Schock, 58 N.D. 340, 342,
226 N.W. 525, 526 (1929); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) ("Motions for directed verdict
are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place.").
60. See 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice xx (2d ed. 1980).
61. 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.8(a), at 15-113 (2d ed. 1980). A virtually identical draft provision was cited with approval in United States v. Smith, 399 F.2d
896, 899 n.1 (6th Cir. 1968).
62. 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.8 commentary, at 15.114 (2d ed.
1980). For a discussion of federal cases concerning the trial judge's disparagement of the
defendant, see Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1313 (1970).
63. See, eg., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 & n.13 (1978) (although not
specifically mandated in the Constitution, presumption of innocence is required by due
process as a fundamental element of a fair trial); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976) (same); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 359, 361-64 (1970) (holding that due process
requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
64. 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 363-66 (The bailiff stated: "'Oh that wicked fellow. . . he is guilty.").
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would carry with the jury.6 6 It seems logical to conclude that because a

judge's position seems even more "official" than a bailiff's, a guilty statement from the bench would be considered to be even more influential

than one from a bailiff. Yet the majority in Davis refused to follow
Parker, distinguishing the two cases on the ground that the judge is
charged with assessing the evidence for the jury and the bailiff is not.67
This distinction is specious. It is certainly true that the two roles are
different, but the essential similarity is that neither the judge nor the bailiff is supposed to influence the jury. Parker should not be read so narrowly; it is based on a denial of fundamental fairness resulting from sixth
amendment violations6" and not merely on the grounds inferred by the
Ninth Circuit. Moreover, the Davis court appeared to be incorrect in
asserting that Parkeris not based on constitutional norms; the holding in
Parkerwas in fact based on due process grounds. 69 It is not unreasona-

ble to agree with the dissenters in Davis who believed that the judge's
guilty statement was "at least much of a threat to the fairness of the trial
as were the judicial errors. . . which were found to be constitutionally
fatal in such cases as [Parker]."7

When the jury has been influenced by the judge, bailiff or any factor
other than the evidence, or even when there is substantial risk of such
influence, the dynamics of the trial are no longer fair. There are many
such circumstances that can cause the proceedings to become impermissibly biased against the defendant. For example, it is normally improper
for a defendant to be tried in a prison uniform 71 or, unless security has
66. See id. at 365.
67. See Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 933 (1974). The court also pointed out that the bailiff's statement was not
subject to confrontation, cross examination or other trial safeguards, whereas the judge's
statement was made in open court and contained a curative instruction. See id. It is
difficult, however, to see how the trial judge's statement in Davis could have been subject
to such safeguards; the judge is not cross-examined, for example. This distinction therefore seems to be of questionable merit. With respect to the judge's use of a curative
instruction, courts have not been consistent in determining whether such an instruction
will cure a guilty statement or guilty indication. Compare id, at 1142 ("[T]he trial judge
made it clear to the jury that [his statement] was only a comment, that it was up to the
jury to come to its own conclusion, and that the jury was entirely at liberty to disregard
the comment.") with United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[W]c
are persuaded that the district court's instructions to the jury could not offset the effects
of his conduct."); see also R. Traynor, supra note 42, at 72 (a curative instruction "may
not counteract the force of comment attended by the authority of the judge's office"). It
is the position of this Note that the importance of the judge's position means that an
instruction attempting to cure a guilty statement will probably be ineffective. See supra
notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
68. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966) (per curiam) (denial of the
sixth amendment rights to an impartial jury, confrontation, cross-examination and
counsel).
69. See id.
70. Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Goodwin, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
71. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-06 (1976); 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.1(b), at 15-78 (2d ed. 1980).
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been shown to be a significant concern, in shackles.72 This is because
there is a risk that the jury will be subtly influenced into believing that
the defendant is guilty or a "bad man."7 3 Such precautions are in accord
with the idea that a verdict should be rendered on the evidence brought
out at trial and not on the basis of extraneous factors.74 Prohibiting
prison uniforms or shackles while permitting guilty statements and guilty
indications excludes subtle influences while permitting the most prejudi-

cial ones to flourish.
One of the goals of the criminal justice system is to bolster public confidence in the trial process.75 Judges who appear biased erode this confidence because their statments or indications fly in the face of traditional
notions of impartiality.76 The enunciation of a coherent constitutional
prohibition of the manifestation of bias through guilty statements or

guilty indications would deter judges from such behavior. Other deterrents, such as impeachment, removal from office, or sanctions by local
bar associations, are rarely used due to their harshness.7 7 Generally, reversals based on aberrant behavior would better effectuate the policy of
protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial than would the discipline of
72. See Brewster v. Bordenkircher, 745 F.2d 913, 914-16 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614-15 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971);
Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873 (1951); 3
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.1(c), at 15-78 (2d ed. 1980).
73. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976); Brewster v. Bordenkircher,
745 F.2d 913, 915 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614-15 (4th
Cir. 1970), cerL denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971).
74. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 503 (1976).
75. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 395
(7th Cir. 1972); B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 112 (1921); Note, DIsqualificationof Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 736, 746-47
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification];1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-1.3,
at 6-10 (2d ed. 1980).
76. See Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1389 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion,
742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983). It is apparent from this opinion that the district court
judge disapproved strongly of the trial judge's statements, see id. at 1386, 1388-89, yet he
felt constrained to deny the writ of habeas corpus because of Davis,see id. at 1386. This
case demonstrates clearly the pernicious effects of following the Davis interpretation that
Murdock fails to state a constitutional standard. See id. at 1386. Other courts and commentators have noted the deleterious effects of judicial bias. See, eg., United States v.
Zarowitz, 326 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Quattrone, 149 F.
Supp. 240, 242-43 (D.D.C. 1957); Altschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand
TrialJudges, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 685 (1972); Disqualification,supra note 75, at 747.
77. See Altschuler, supra note 76, at 695-96; Comment, Harmless Error Abettor of
Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 457, 475 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Courtroom Misconduct]; see also Freedman, Removal and Discipline of FederalJudges,
31 Mercer L. Rev. 681, 685 (1980) (in order to protect judicial independence, impeachment is an extremely difficult method of removal); Ward, Can the Federal Courts Keep
Order in Their Own House? Appellate Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders of
JudicialCouncils, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 233, 237-38 (impeachment difficult; other remedies rarely used because judges, for social and professional reasons, are reluctant to pass
on behavior of other judges).
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judges.78
B. Due Process Requires Extending to the States a Prohibitionon
Guilty Statements and Indications
Unless what is now considered to be only a federal guideline is extended to the states, there is a substantial risk that a trial that would be
considered fundamentally "unfair and unacceptable in federal court
[would be] good enough in the state courts."79 Although the due process
clause does not require uniform procedures in state and federal courts,80
it does require fundamental fairness in the trial process in all courts. 8 '
This is destroyed when state court judges are permitted to stray from
their role as impartial arbiters.
It is basic to the accepted concept of selective incorporation that fundamental provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the states through the
due process clause in the same manner as they apply to the federal government. 82 The states must therefore adhere to any standards that are
promulgated to ensure fundamental fairness in a trial.8" Duncan v. Louisiana,84 the case that determined that the right to a trial by jury was
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice,"8 " required the states
to meet the federal standard.86 Malloy v. Hogan17 extended the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states, because the
privilege is designed to protect the basic fairness of the trial.88 Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, pointed out that "[ilt would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege . . . depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or
federal court."8 9
78. See Minor v. Harris, 556 F.Supp. 1371, 1388-89 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. 742 F.2d
1430 (2d Cir. 1983); Courtroom Misconduct, supra note 77, at 474-75.
79. See Daye v. Attorney Gen., 712 F.2d 1566, 1573 (2d Cir. 1983) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984).
80. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 656 (1948); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946); Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d
572, 579 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981). See supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
81. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See supra Pt. I.A. and accompanying notes.
82. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 148-49 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 454-57
(2d ed. 1983). For a recent discussion of the background, scope and application of selective incorporation, see generally Israel, Selective Incorporation:Revisited, 71 Geo. L.J.
253 (1982).
83. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
84. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
85. Id. at 149.
86. See id.
87. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
88. See id.at 3-11.
89. See id. at 11.
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In only rare cases has the Court not extended an important guarantee

of trial fairness to the state level. The most notable example of this was

Apodaca v. Oregon,9" which held that state courts could permit

nonunanimous jury verdicts although federal courts did not. 9 The result

in Apodaca, however, is a product of a unique voting arrangement in
which four dissenters argued that unanimity is fundamental to a fair trial
and therefore constitutionally required at both levels,92 and four justices,
joining in a plurality opinion, indicated that although state and federal
procedures must meet the same standard, unanimity is not required on
either level.9" Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, and therefore

the "swing vote," believed that unanimity is required in federal courts
but not in state courts.94 Thus eight of the nine justices were in favor of

uniform procedures, but they differed on which standard was required. 95
Thus, if it is recognized in federal court that prevention of bias can

best be effectuated by a prohibition on guilty statements and guilty indi-

cations,9 6 this ban should be extended to state trials. Unlike the Apodaca

situation, in which policy and empirical arguments may be made for lowering federal standards to eliminate the unanimous jury requirement,9"

when there is the possibility that a jury will be improperly influenced
only the strictest standards can protect the accused. When a fundamen-

tal imbalance in the trial can occur there must be strong protection, and
the federal standard would best ensure the constitutional guarantees of
due process and fair trial.
90. 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion of White, J.).
91. See id. at 406.

92. See id at 414-15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
382-83 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (companion case to Apodaca; opinion applies to
both cases); id. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same).
93. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
94. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 371 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (companion case to Apodaca; opinion applies to both cases). Justice Powell argued in favor of
the application of a fundamental fairness standard to the jury trial requirements, see id. at
373 (Powell, J., concurring), rather than the selective incorporation approach apparently
supported by the other eight justices, see Israel, supra note 82, at 299. The difference
between these two approaches to the due process clause is that the fundamental fairness
approach determines whether a particular aspect of a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental and therefore required of the states; the selective incorporation theory determines
whether the entire Bill of Rights provision is fundamental-if so, its protection is extended to the states with the same standards that apply to the federal government. See id.
at 290-92.
95. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 82, at 456 n.43.
96. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
97. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410-14.
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II.
CORRECTING THE VIOLATION OF A DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN GUILTY STATEMENTS
AND INDICATIONS ARE MADE

A. Habeas Corpus is the Proper Remedy
When a defendant in a state criminal trial is convicted but believes that
his constitutional rights have been violated, generally he must first raise
his claims in state appellate tribunals and thus exhaust the direct remedies available under state law. 98 Assuming that the exhaustion requirements are met, the aggrieved defendant has various federal remedies. He
may sue under the Civil Rights Act for damages for denial of his civil
rights,9 9 but this will not set aside the conviction. There are two direct
federal remedies following decisions of the state court of last resort: appeal'" or writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.' 0 ' These remedies,
however, are narrowly available to state prisoners. 02 Certiorari is totally
discretionary 10 3 and is rarely granted," ° and appeal, although theoretically available as of right,' 0 5 has also been limited in scope; such cases are
often dismissed or summarily affirmed.' 0 6
Habeas corpus relief is the most effective and important form of federal post-conviction relief for state prisoners.1 07 The scope of the remedy
is limited, however, allowing federal courts to hear applications for writs
"only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the
98. E.g., J. Cook, supra note 13, § 111, at 259; D. Wilkes, supra note 13, § 8-15, at
147; L. Yackle, supra note 13, § 52, at 231.
The question of what constitutes proper exhaustion is complex and beyond the scope of
this Note. See generally J. Cook, supra note 13, §§ 111-112 (discussing exhaustion of
remedies); D. Wilkes, supra note 13, §§ 8-15 to -21 (same); 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4264, at 625-56 (1978) (same); L. Yackle,
supra note 13, §§ 52-69 (same).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982).
101. See id. § 1257(3).
102. See D. Wilkes, supra note 13, § 8-2, at 117; L. Yackle, supra note 13, § 14, at 7172.
103. Sup. Ct. R. 17(1); see 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4004, at 504-26 (1977).
104. See D. Wilkes, supra note 13, § 8-2, at 117 (Court grants only a few hundred of
the thousands of applications for certiorari filed every year); L. Yackle, supra note 13,
§ 14, at 72 (Court chooses to review only cases of national importance, while denying
most petitions without comment).
105. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 82, at 35; 16 C. Wright, A.
Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, supra note 103, § 4003, at 500; Hart, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 88-89
(1959).
106. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 82, at 35; D. Wilkes, supra
note 13, § 8-2, at 117; 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, supra note
103, § 4003, at 501, § 4014, at 631; L. Yackle, supra note 13, § 14, at 72; Hart, supra note
105, at 89 & n.13.
107. See D. Wilkes, supra note 13, § 8-2, at 116; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
supra note 98, § 4261, at 605; L. Yackle, supra note 13, §§ 14-15, at 72-73.
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Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 1 ' Because this
remedy is available as of right, however, it is more likely to result in

review by a federal court than any of the direct remedies discussed
above. 109
Traditionally, the writ of habeas corpus has been used to attack convictions based on jurisdictional defects,"' but the writ may also issue

when fundamental constitutional rights have been violated during the

course of the proceedings leading to the conviction."1 1 The statute au-

thorizes the writ in cases in which the applicant "did not receive a full,
fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding"11" or when the

"applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court

proceeding."' 1 3 Thus, errors that infect the integrity of the trial process
can be rectified through habeas relief. If, as demonstrated above, guilty4

statements and indications are violations of the right to a fair trial,"'

habeas corpus should be the proper remedy to correct their prejudicial

effect.
Although the recent trend in the courts has been to limit the availability of the habeas corpus remedy,' 5 these concerns fail to state a persuasive case against the use of habeas to correct the violation of rights that
occurs when judges overstep the bounds of acceptable behavior. The
Supreme Court in Engle v. Isaac"6 indicated its objections to "jl]iberal
allowance of the writ.""' 7 Although Engle dealt with procedural forfeiture of the availability of habeas relief rather than with jurisdictional or

substantive issues,"' the Court's reasons for limiting use of the writ are
worth considering.

Such consideration is warranted regardless of

whether the use of habeas relief in cases of guilty statements is characterized as an extension of the writ's application or, as proposed, as merely a
correction of a failure to apply the writ in an area in which it has always
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
109. See D. Wilkes, supra note 13, § 8-2, at 117.
110. See J.Cook, supra note 13, § 86, at 201-02; L. Yackle, supra note 13, § 89, at 358;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(4) (1982) (writ will be granted if state court lacked jurisdiction over subject matter or person of the accused).
111. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 685 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1953); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1982) (remedies in federal courts for state prisoners).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6) (1982).
113. Id.§ 2254(d)(7).
114. See supra part I.A. and accompanying notes.
115. See 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 98, § 4261, at 605; L.
Yackle, supra note 13, § 21, at 101-06; Soloff, Litigation And Relitigation- The Uncertain
Status of FederalHabeasCorpusfor State Prisoners,6 Hofstra L. Rev. 297, 301-02 (1978);

see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29 (1982) (reasons for limiting habeas corpus
relief); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-81 (1977) (same); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 515-29 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against Court's recent limitations on
habeas).
116. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
117. Id at 127.
118. See iL at 110.
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been used-protection of the right to a fundamentally fair trial.' 19
One of the objections in Engle is that use of federal collateral attack on
state court convictions undermines usual principles of finality. 2 ' This
requires balancing the interests of finality and fundamental fairness.
Although it is arguable that many habeas petitions are frivolous, 2 ' when
the error asserted goes to a basic structural element of the fairness of the
trial, vindication of the constitutional right should prevail over considerations of judicial administration.' 2 2
Engle also suggests that liberal use of the writ degrades the trial process.'" 3 Liberalized use of habeas to correct basic imbalances, however,
would probably lead to greater confidence in the trial process. Although
Engle foresees trial participants failing to use their full efforts at trial in
reliance on the availability of subsequent collateral relief, 24 this criticism
119. See, e.g., Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779, 781 (10th Cir.) (denial of a fair and
impartial trial... renders a trial and conviction for a criminal offense illegal and void
and redress therefor is within the ambit of habeas corpus"), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681
(1942); Barfield v. Harris, 540 F. Supp. 451, 466 (E.D.N.C. 1982) ("[o]nly 'those errors
that are so fundamental that they infect. . . the integrity of the process by which [the]
judgment was obtained' should entitle a petitioner to habeas relief") (quoting Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), aff'd, 719 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2401 (1984).
120. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982); see also Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and FederalHabeas CorpusforState Prisoners,76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963) (arguing
for greater respect for finality); Address by John N. Mitchell, Restoring the Finality of
Justice, Ala. State Bar Ass'n Annual Banquet (June 25, 1971), reprinted in 32 Ala. Law.
367 (1971) (same).
121. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 547-49 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536-37 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Reply Brief for Petitioner at
12-13, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), reprinted in 13 BNA Law Reprints, no. 2,
149, at 168-69 (1981-82); C. Wright, supra note 13, § 53, at 345; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller
& E. Cooper, supra note 98, § 4261, at 602; Santarelli, Too Much is Enough, Trial, MayJune 1973, at 40; Weick, Apportionment of the JudicialResources in Criminal Cases:
Should Habeas Corpus be Eliminated?,21 DePaul L. Rev. 740, 747 (1972).
122. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 550 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When a
person's liberty is at stake. . . there surely is no justification for the creation of needless
procedural hurdles."); Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can HabeasSurvive the Flood?, 6
Cum. L. Rev. 363, 380 (1975) ("Where allegations of deprivations of constitutional rights
are present, deprivations which may lead to the total and dehumanizing loss of personal
liberty, the benefits conferred by repose are far outweighed by the detrimental effects of
mindless adherence to the principle of finality."); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1956) (Habeas corpus is important because judicial
neatness should be subordinate to "the rights of a human being. .

.

.The aim which

justifies the existence of habeas corpus is . . .that it is better that a guilty man go free
than that an innocent one be punished.").
123. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
124. See id. This is the famous "sandbagging" argument made by the Supreme Court
in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977), in rejecting the rule of Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), allowing federal habeas relief to state prisoners absent a deliberate bypass of the state court procedure. The Court in Wainwright argued that the "deliberate by-pass" rule would encourage defense lawyers to not raise their constitutional
claims and gamble on a not guilty verdict at trial, saving the constitutional claim for a
federal habeas court, if necessary. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89. This point was vehemently disputed by Justice Brennan, who stated that "no rational lawyer would risk the
'sandbagging.'" Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent observed
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is inapposite to the situation at hand because no one has the ability to
control the actions of the trial judge except the judge himself,2' It is
highly unlikely that he would purposely expose his conduct to habeas
review. In fact, another objection in Engle is that reversals through
habeas undermine judicial m6rale. 26 However, judicial conduct is exactly what must be controlled in situations involving guilty statements
and guilty indications; it would be perverse to prohibit reversal for judicial misconduct, or at least poor judgment, in order to "protect" judicial
morale.
The final arguments against wide use of habeas relief concern its perceived costs, both to society as a whole and to the federal system. 2 ' Due
to the passage of time and the consequent problems of memory and witness location, the writ of habeas corpus will in practice allow some guilty
individuals to go free. 28 Justice Brennan's dissent in Engle, however,
points out that it is wrong to punish the prisoner because of the costs of
the retrial and that it is equally reasonable that the state should bear the
costs engendered by its representative's violation of the Constitution."2 9
The Court itself has stated that the interests of a criminal defendant are
of such magnitude that "our society imposes almost the entire risk of
error upon itself." 3 ' With respect to the financial costs of habeas, the
fear of docket congestion in federal courts may be exaggerated: The
number of habeas filings is not excessive and their rate of increase is
low. t31 In addition, the use of habeas relief to correct guilty statements
that the Wainwright decision gave a lawyer two choices: He could do his job properly by
presenting the constitutional claim in state court, which would preserve both appellate
and habeas review if the claim were rejected, or he could "sandbag," increasing the risk
of conviction and forfeiting all state review of the constitutional claim. In addition the
lawyer would have to deceive the habeas court into believing that there was no deliberate
bypass. Failure to do so would bar all further review. The belief that lawyers would
choose the second option "simply offends common sense," Id. at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
125. Although it is possible for the defense attorney to object and ask for a curative
instruction, the judge need not give one if he does not think it necessary. Objection
would serve, at a minimum, to preserve the issue for appeal. Even if the instruction is
given, its effect is questionable. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. It is also
possible that an objection in this sort of case could backfire, particularly in trials in which
a judge has made numerous guilty statements or indications, because the objections could
draw the jury's attention to the judge's objectionable actions. See R. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods § 4.2, at 167-68 (2d ed. 1973).
126. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982).
127. See id.at 126-28; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 & n.31 (1976); Scheckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); see also L Yackle,
supra note 13, § 15 (discussing costs of habeas); 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
supra note 98, § 4261, at 600-03 (same); Bator, supra note 120, at 451 (same); Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142,
148-49 (1970) (same); Weick, supra note 121, at 744-48 (same).
128. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
490-91 (1976); L. Yackle, supra note 13, § 21, at 105; Friendly, supra note 127, at 150.
129. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 147-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
131. Although the sheer number of habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners may
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should in the long run deter judges from such132conduct and ultimately
lead to fewer trials requiring collateral review.

The argument advanced in Engle that federalism suffers when habeas
writs are used to attack state convictions 1 33 disregards the fact that the

Constitution limits state court power in many areas 134 and that habeas

relief is exactly the remedy contemplated for the occasional abuse of constitutional rights in a state criminal trial. 3 5 Thus, when the defendant's
fundamental right to a fair trial is violated by the guilty statements or

guilty indications of the judge, habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
B. The Standard of Review
If guilty statements and guilty indications are errors of constitutional

magnitude 136 and may be rectified through issuance of habeas corpus
writs, 137 the proper standard of review for the court hearing the habeas
petition must be determined. In other words, assuming that the convict's

trial has been infected by guilty statements or guilty indications, and assuming that all of the complex pre-issuance procedural hurdles have been
be large, they do not comprise an inordinately high percentage of all civil filings in United
States district courts. Whereas state prisoner filings comprised 10.9% of all civil filings in
district courts in the 12-month period ending June 30, 1983, see Admin. Office of U.S.
Courts, 1983 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts 123, habeas petitions by state prisoners only accounted for approximately
one-third of these petitions (8,532 of 26,421), id. at 127, table 21. The number of habeas
petitions filed by state prisoners was less than the number of suits filed under labor, Social
Security, and civil rights laws, for example, id. at 122, table 18. Twice as many of the
state prisoner filings concerned civil rights complaints. Id. at 127, table 21.
Fears concerning the rate of increase of state habeas petitions may also be exaggerated.
From 1978 through 1983 there was a 21.3% increase in habeas filings by state prisoners,
while, over the same period there was, for example, a 24.2% increase in civil rights filings
by federal prisoners and a remarkable 81.8% increase in civil rights filings by state prisoners. See id. The increase in habeas filings by state prisoners in the one-year period
1982-1983 was 5.9%, as compared with 15.4% for mandamus petitions from state prisoners. Id. This 5.9% increase can be favorably compared with the rate of increase over the
same one-year period for bankruptcy suits (61.3%), Social Security law filings (58.6%),
or securities, commodities and exchanges law filings (22.7%). Id. at 122, table 18.
It must also be noted that the prison population has risen dramatically-almost doubling in twelve years. The Federal and state prison population was approximately 384,000
on March 31, 1982, and approximately 369,000 on December 31, 1981, compared to
approximately 196,000 on December 31, 1970. See Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 1982
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
102. It is therefore not surprising that the number of petitions has increased.
132. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
133. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
134. See id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
498-501 (1953) (majority opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866,
867 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Carroll, supra note 122, at 381-82 ("because the federal judiciary exists to identify and protect individual rights, and because federal courts are manned
by judges institutionally isolated from collateral pressures, any friction produced by
habeas corpus review is bearable.").
136. See supra Pt. I.
137. See supra Pt. II.A.
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overcome,1 38 under what circumstances should the writ be issued and the
conviction vacated?
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Rose v. Lundy, 3 9 proposed four categories of constitutional error claims, covering the entire spectrum of possibilities: 1) claims that are actually not of constitutional dimensions; 2)
constitutional claims that are not of sufficient magnitude to reverse, even
on direct review; 3) errors important enough to reverse on direct review,
but not on collateral attack; and 4) "errors that are so fundamental that
they infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity
of the process by which that judgment was obtained."''
This final category would therefore require collateral relief. 4 ' Justice Stevens recognized the apparent incongruity in suggesting that there is a class of
constitutional error that is not harmless but still is not so egregious as to
render the trial fundamentally unfair."4 2 He would fit into this category
cases in which the Court has found a constitutional right but refused to
apply it retroactively,' 43 or where counsel failed to raise a timely objection."' Justice Stevens indicated
that such errors may not in fact be of
45
constitutional dimension.1
It has been proposed that the best way to control judicial-as well as
prosecutorial-misconduct would be to require, based on the supervisory
power, automatic reversal for bad faith violations of known standards of
behavior.'1 This policy, although leading to a proper result in most
cases, neglects to consider the unavailability of federal supervisory power
138. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
139. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
140. Id. at 543-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See idL at 544 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited three cases that
would illustrate this rule of automatic reversal: Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923),
in which the trial was dominated by mob violence; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935), in which the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony; and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which the conviction was based on a brutally extorted
confession. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 544 & nn.9-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 543 n.8. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id.(Stevens, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 49 (1973)
(rule of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), requiring objective evidence on
the record to justify greater sentence imposed after successful appeal not applied retroactively); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1968) (per curiam) (right to trial by
jury in serious criminal cases and contempts not applied retroactively); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (rules requiring presence of counsel at pretrial identification not
applied retroactively); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966) (interrogation
guidelines of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), not applied retroactively); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,
419 (1966) (rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), forbidding adverse comment on defendant's failure to testify not aplied retroactively); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), not applied
retroactively).
144. Rose, 455 U.S. at 543 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Eagle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 124-25 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-88 (1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508 n.3 (1976).
145. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 543 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. See Courtroom Misconduct, supra note 77, at 470-75.
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to overturn state trial verdicts. 47 In addition, the judicial behavior standards themselves cannot apply to the states unless the violations are of

constitutional magnitude. 48 Moreover, this proposal for automatic reversal based on supervisory power is too narrow, because it applies only

to "bad faith" violations, 14 9 even though inadvertent violations would
often be equally harmful. As previously discussed, the use of supervisory
power allows the court to beg the question of constitutionality and may
lead to denial of a fair trial in state courts. 5 0 What is needed instead is a
realization that guilty statements and indications belong in the fourth of
Justice Stevens' categories and require per se reversal because they fundamentally infect the trial process.
The idea that some constitutional errors require automatic reversal did

not originate with Justice Stevens' dissent in Rose v. Lundy. In fact, until
Fahy v. Connecticut'5 ' in 1963, it had generally been believed that all

constitutional error required reversal.' 52 In Fahy the Supreme Court analyzed an alleged fourth amendment violation and indicated the possibility that the error could be found harmless, although it failed to make this
finding under the facts.' 5 3 This left open the question of whether consti-

tutional error could be found harmless. In 1967, the Court in Chapman
v. California"' extended the "harmless error" rationale to constitutional
errors.' 5 5 But while stating that "there may be some constitutional errors which. . . are so unimportant and insignificant that they may...
be deemed harmless,"' 5 6 the Court also recognized that there are "some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error."' 5 7 Although the opinion did not indicate
any way to distinguish errors requiring per se reversal from those that
147. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
149. See Courtroom Misconduct, supra note 77, at 470-75.
150. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
151. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
152. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42-44 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(disputing Court's institution of a harmless constitutional error rule); Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) (if error is harmless, verdict should stand
"except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command
of Congress"); CourtroomMisconduct, supra note 77, at 460-61 (not until Fahy did Court
indicate possibility of harmless constitutional error). The only prior case in which the
Court had found constitutional error harmless was Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458
(1900), which involved testimony introduced at trial in violation of the defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. See id. at 471. The error was held harmless because
Motes admitted his guilt at the trial. See id. at 475-76; see also Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of FederalConstitutionalError-A Processin Search of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 15, 15 & n.2. (1976) (discussing Motes).
153. See Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86. The Court found that the error was in fact prejudicial
and therefore not harmless. See id. at 91-92.
154. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
155. Id. at 21-22, 24 (reviewing court must satisfy itself that the constitutional error
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to hold such an error harmless).
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 23.
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could be found harmless, in a footnote it cited three cases as examples of
errors requiring per se reversal:1 5 8 Payne v. Arkansas, concerning coerced
°
confessions; 159 Gideon v. Wainwright, concerning the right to counsel;16
161
judge.
impartial
an
to
and Tumey v. Ohio, concerning the right
Because the Court has not chosen to establish guidelines or specific
categories of error that require automatic reversal, it has become neces-

sary to attempt to interpret the significance of the Chapman footnote.
One commentator, Professor Field, has categorized the three cases cited

therein into two types: those especially damaging to the defendant
(Payne) and "those that infect the entire trial process" (Gideon and
Tumey).1 62 Professor Field argues that in light of the Supreme Court
decisions that allow a finding in habeas corpus proceedings that overwhelming evidence of guilt can outweigh error, 163 errors especially damaging to the defendant should not require per se reversal.1 6 But when

the error affects the trial process, automatic reversal would be required in

any case, because the verdict itself is suspect. 165 One may similarly categorize the cases cited in Stevens' dissent in Rose 66 as examples of situations requiring collateral relief: errors especially damaging to the

defendant, such as the brutal extortion of a confession,

67

and errors that

infect the entire trial process, such as a trial dominated by mob 69violence 68 and knowing use by the prosecutor of perjured testimony.'

Professor Mause has attempted to classify cases for which automatic
reversal would be warranted, not all of which are relevant to this discussion.17 The first relevant category-inherently prejudicial errors"'7-

embraces, among other things, errors that concern the impartiality of the
158. See id at 23 n.8.

159. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
160. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
161. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
162. See Field, supra note 152, at 29.
163. See id at 30. The "overwhelming evidence" test permits consitutional error to be

held harmless when the jury has been presented with "overwhelming evidence of [the]
petitioner's guilt." Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972); see also United
States v. Young, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1985) (error held harmless due to "overwhelming
evidence of... intent"); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 558 (1968) (Black, I.,
dissenting) (error held harmless when "the overwhelming evidence ... amply demon-

strates petitioner's guilt"); Field, supra note 152, at 16-36 (discussing "overwhelming evidence" test and arguing against its continued use by the Court).
164. Field, supra note 152, at 30.
165. See iL at 30-31; see also Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 877 (2d Cir. 1985)
("notions of justice require errors that ... debase the entire judicial process be corrected
at all costs, since the trial itself-and hence the judgment-was contaminated").
166. 455 U.S. at 544 nn.9-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 141 and accom-

panying text.
167. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
168. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

169. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
170. See Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError. The Implicationsof Chapman v. California, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 519, 540 (1969).
171. See idi at 540-47.
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Professor Mause would include in this category certain ques-

tions concerning the admission of evidence,173 situations in which the
judge had a financial interest in the outcome,17 4 and cases in which a

judge summarily convicted an attorney for contempt following a personal attack without bringing in another judge to take his place.1 75 This
category is worthy of per se reversal because the preeminent position and
persuasiveness of the judge make it nearly impossible for an appellate
court to retrospectively determine the effect of judicial bias on the
jury. 176

A second category encompasses errors that inherently have a tendency
to undermine the reliability of the guilt-determination process. 7 7 Automatic reversal is necessary to prevent the "special peril" that exists when
the trial process is unreliable. 7 A third category includes errors that
undermine public respect for the criminal justice system; 179 such errors

should be reversed in order to maintain public confidence in the system. 180 Under any of these classifications, guilty statements and guilty

indications qualify for per se reversal as fundamental constitutional errors affecting the balance of fairness in a trial.
172. See id. at 542.
173. In Professor Mause's view these errors may not be reversible error in themselves
because these areas are within the discretion of the trial judge. See id.
174. See id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). See supra note 29.
175. See Mause, supra note 170, at 542 (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 12
(1954)). For other cases on this point, see Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 46366 (1971); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d
389, 392-97 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) ("If the contempt charged
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at
the trial or hearing ..
").
176. See Manse, supra note 170, at 542; see also United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d
302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973) (appellate review of judge's conduct difficult); United States v.
Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970);
Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1378-79 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), ajfd mem., 742 F.2d
1430 (1983). See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
177. See Mause, supra note 170, at 547-51. This category would include the admission
of unreliable evidence, such as involuntary confessions, the denial of the right to counsel,
or the presence of a prejudiced judge or jury. Id. at 548.
178. Id. Professor Mause would exclude from this category violations of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (requirement that arrestee be informed of rights), because the rules in those cases
exclude reliable evidence in order to deter police conduct. See Mause, supra note 170, at
548-49. See also Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 877 (2d Cir. 1985) (where trial
process contaminated, error must be corrected "at all costs").
179. See Mause, supra note 170, at 554-56. This category would include any error that
implicates the competency or impartiality of the judge or the jury, as well as cases such as
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which a suspect was forced to vomit up
evidence. The Court found this to be a constitutional violation because the official misconduct "shock[ed] the conscience" of the Court. Id. at 172. See Mause, supra note 170,
at 554-55.
180. Mause, supra note 170, at 554.
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C. PracticalConsiderations

A final distinction must be drawn between guilty statements and guilty
indications. Generally it is obvious when a judge uses a guilty statement.
But it is not always apparent when he has made his belief known to the
jury without an explicit statement.""' There are two types of problems

that may occur. First, there may be indications that cannot appear in
the record for appeal. These would include allegations that the judge's

tone of voice, facial expressions or manner indicated his belief in the defendant's guilt. 182 Unfortunately, it is usually beyond the ability of the
reviewing court to correct these errors because in most cases it lacks audio or videotapes of the proceedings. 18 3 The second problem is one of
interpretation: When does a judge cross the line of acceptable conduct
into an area of reversible error?" 8 The uniqueness of each case makes it
impossible to establish a precise standard.

The appellate court must make its own determination after examining
the totality of the circumstances. If the line has not been crossed, there is
no constitutional violation and normal error analysis should proceed. If,
however, the reviewing court determines that there has been a denial of

due process or the right to a fair trial, automatic reversal would be required. Of course, this case-by-case approach gives substantial discretion
to the reviewing court. Nevertheless, the standard of per se reversal
181. See United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973) ("There is simply
no handy tool with which to gauge. . . . [a] claim of unfair judicial conduct. [That]
requires a close scrutiny of each tile in the mosaic of the trial so that. . . we can make a
safe judgment that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial to which he was entitled."); United States v. Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Few claims are
more difficult to resolve than the claim that the trial judge. . . has thrown his weight in
favor of one side to such an extent that it cannot be said that the trial has been a fair
one."), cert denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1378
(S.D.N.Y.) ("Claims that defects in the trial process precluded a fair trial pose difficult
problems for constitutional resolution. They require the Court to scrutinize the entire
trial to determine whether the resulting conviction violated due process."), aff'd mea.,
742 F.2d 1430 (1983).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 1982), cert denied,
462 U.S. 1118 (1983); United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460,467-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 833 (1974); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 387 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
183. See e.g., Perricone v. Kansas City S. Ry., 704 F.2d 1376, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[The judge] can communicate his attitude in a thousand ways from a cocked eyebrow
to a sideways glance. Those will not be of record. They are not reviewable."); United
States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Where a videotape or sound recording
of the trial is in the appellate record, it may be used to support the claim that a defendant
was denied a fair trial by the trial judge's actions."), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983);
United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 981, 984 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[I]n the absence of a
videotape and sound recording of the trial we have no way of assessing appellants' claims
that the trial judge, by his gestures, tone of voice and facial expressions, sought to intimidate counsel, or indicated hostility, belief or disbelief in witnesses or partiality."), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 992 (1981); United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 468 n.2 (2d Cir.)
("[W]e have no way, absent videotape and sound recording, of appraising appellants'"
claims of prejudice.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
184. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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would send a message to appeals courts to view judicial behavior strictly
and to take strong action to deter trial judges from behaving in a biased
way. This would ultimately lead to increased fairness in the criminal
justice system and the preservation of the defendant's fundamental rights
to a fair trial and due process.
CONCLUSION

The use of guilty statements and guilty indications are constitutional
error because they violate a defendant's rights to a fair trial and due process. It has been recognized that judges should not use guilty statements
and guilty indications and that it is incongruous for a system to ensure
fundamental fairness in federal trials but to deny similar protection in
state trials. Habeas corpus relief, which is appropriate when a conviction
is obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, is the
proper remedy for this wrong. Judges' use of guilty statements and indications infect the trial process; reviewing courts should therefore automatically reverse any conviction that occurs after such action. A
standard of per se reversal is necessary because of the judge's strong influence over the jury, the great likelihood of prejudice, the difficulty of
retrospectively weighing this prejudice, and the ineffectiveness of any
other sort of deterrent.
Jordan D. Becker

